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Poverty law in the United States is largely law about women and the
children for whom they care.1 That assertion is meant to be
something of an overstatement, but just something of an
overstatement. The empirical realities of poverty and the lives of
poor people in the United States, particularly as those realities apply
to those who need or receive public assistance, is disproportionately
about women and the children of whom those women are
caretakers.2 It seems, therefore, especially appropriate that those who
identify themselves as "feminists"--those who support and strive for
the full social, political, moral, and economic dignity and equality of
human beings regardless of sex or gender-should raise their voices
* Assistant Professor of Law, American University, Washington College of Law. J.D.,
Harvard Law School, MA, Fordham University, B.S., University of Scranton. The author wishes
to thank his colleagues Joan Williams and Adrienne Davis for their invitation to participate in
this journal symposium and for their constant support and friendship. Special thanks go to my
colleague, Led Volpp, who read and offered extremely valuable comments on an earlier draft of
this Article.
1. See Peter M. Cicchino, The Problem Child: An Empirical Survey and Rhetorical Analysis of
Child Poverty in the United States, 5 J.L. & POLY 5, 36-37 (1996) and accompanying notes
(observing, inter alia, higher rates of child poverty in households headed by women). See
generally MIMI ABRAMOVrTz, REGULATING THE LIVES OF WOMEN: SOCIAL WELFARE POuCY FROM
COLONIAL TIMES TO THE PRESENT (1996) (surveying the history of the feminization of poverty,
especially chapter 10 "Aid to Families with Dependent Children" describing the rise in poor
households headed by women); see also LAwRENCE MISHEL, JARED BERNSTEIN, JOHN SCHMITT,
THE STATE OF WORKING AMERICA 280-82 (table 6.4) (1998-1999) (noting highest rates-about
40%--of poverty for female headed households).
2. See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
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in defense of poor people and those threatened by poverty5
Martha Fineman is such a voice-a powerful, articulate,
reasonable, and impassioned voice. Her article on the social
responsibility for dependency, Cracking the Foundational Myths:
Independence, Autonomy, and Self-Sufficiency,4 will, I have no doubt,
make an important contribution to the literature on law and social
policy directed toward supporting those who perform functions that
are socially valuable but undervalued or ignored by the market.
Laudatory introductions in response pieces are, however, rather
like the antecedent clause in sentences that run: I have the greatest
respect for X, but .... Whatever the magnitude of the praise that
precedes the disjunction, one knows the thrust of a verbal dagger is
soon to follow.
That is not my intention here. Rather, I want to identify and
discuss, partly as good-natured teasing, but mostly because I believe it
implicates an extraordinarily important development in
contemporary feminism, one aspect of Fineman's argument. From
the start it should be clear that Fineman's argument, at least the first
part of her argument, is above all else a normative or moral argument
about why we, as a society, ought to support caregivers. That point
should be obvious."
What may go unnoticed by readers most versed in feminist
literature, readers long conditioned to respond with reflexive hostility
toward essentialism of any kind, particularly that which takes the
form of arguments from "nature," is that the structure and method of
Fineman's argument is perfectly consistent with a tradition of moral
argument that dates back at least to the time of Aristotle. This
tradition of moral argument relies upon an idea that, for lack of a
better term, may be called "human nature." This type of argument,
while respecting the complexity and diversity of human experience,
also holds that there are certain universal realities characteristic of
the human condition across space and time: needs and capacities
3. The economic effects of the systemic subordination of women in our society are not
confined to poor families. Affluent and well-educated women also face impediments to career
advancement and economic success. See, e.g., Ann R. Tickameyer, Public Policy and Private Lives:
Social and Spatial Dimensions of Women's Poverty and Welfare Policy in the United States, 84 KY. LJ.
721, 725 (1995-96) (noting that the women have an "economic disadvantage in the labor
market"). Given the abolition of the federal entitlement to public assistance in 1996, and the
special urgency of the needs of the poorest families, the emphasis here is on female headed
households in poverty.
4. See Martha Albertson Fineman, Cracking the Foundational Myths: Independence, Autonomy,
and Self-Sufficiency, 8 AM. U.J. GENDER, SOC. POLY& L. 13 (2000).
5. Though Fineman's analysis of the concepts of subsidy and dependency are especially
insightful, my focus is on the first part of her argument for the collective responsibility to care
for caregivers.
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that all human beings, as human beings, share, and material
conditions that make human flourishing more likely. Moreover, as I
contend below, this type of moral argument takes the universal and
inevitable aspects of our common humanity as the starting point for
its political and ethical inquiry.
That one of the most prominent feminists in legal academy makes
such an argument should not, in itself, be so surprising. But that
such an argument should come from a writer who has so brilliantly
uncovered and criticized the social construction of gender and family
roles-quintessential examples of social realities long taken to be
"natural"-is worthy of comment.6
In what follows, I will: (1) describe and commend an ancient
tradition of western normative argument; (2) offer a schematic of
Fineman's central argument, as I understand it, on the social duty of
care to caregivers, and explain why I believe Fineman's argument in
structure and method is similar to the traditional form of normative
argument I have described and commended; and (3) offer
concluding reflections on why I believe this similarity is part of a
salutary and important development in feminism in the United
States; a development that would be strengthened if scholars as
prominent and prolific as Martha Fineman acknowledged explicitly
that they have become part of that tradition of moral argument.
I. A TRADITION OF MORAL ARGUMENT
In his hilarious and withering critique of law and economics, the
late Arthur Leff observed of the intellectual context in which we now
exist:
While all this [the movement from Formalism to Realism in
law] was going on, most likely conditioning it in fact, the
knowledge of good and evil, as an intellectual subject, was
being systematically and effectively destroyed. The historical
fen through which ethical wanderings led was abolished in the
early years of this century (not for the first time, but very
clearly this time); normative thought crawled out of the swamp
and died in the desert. There arose a great number of schools
of ethics-axiological, materialistic, evolutionary, intuitionist,
situationalist, existentialist, and so on-but they all suffered
from the same fate: either they were seen to be ultimately
premised on an intuition (buttressed or not by nosecounts of
6. See generally MARTHA ALBERTSON FRINMAN, THE NEUTERED MOTHER, THE SEXUAL
FAMILY, AND OTHER TWNTIETH CENTURY TRAGEDIES 44-47 (1995) (discussing the continuing
debate over categorizing women, which revolves around universalized representations of
women).
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those seemingly having the same intuitions), or they were even
more arbitrary than that, based solely on some "for the sake of
argument" premises. I will put the current situation as sharply
and nastily as possible: there is today no way of "proving" that
napalming babies is bad except by asserting it (in a louder and
louder voice), or by defining it as so, early in one's game, and
then later slipping it through, in a whisper, as a conclusion. 7
Left's description of the prevailing sense of the state of normative
argument, at least among intellectuals, seems as true today as when it
was written twenty-five years ago. The problem of the basis of moral
knowledge-what for lack of a better term might be called the
problem of foundations-has produced an immense literature in law
reviews alone.8 The problem of foundations implicates not just
whether normative propositions are true or false, but how we can
know that truth or falsity. The stand we take on those issues
significantly determines where we stand on a related but, from the
standpoint of human community, no less important question: Are all
moral arguments either circular or interminable since they rest on
asserted premises for which no better argument can be made as
opposed to an alternative set of premises?
The problem may be more easily seen by analyzing the structure of
normative argument.
1. Mary asserts that X is good.
2. John asks Mary why she believes X is good.
3. Mary responds either:
a. X is good in itself; or
b. X is good in terms of Z, to which John may ask why is Z
good, to which Mary will respond that Z is good in terms of
W, and so forth until Mary reaches some entity that she
claims is good in itself.
The difficulty with such an argument is that when Mary eventually
reaches the entity that she claims is good in itself, John may ask, "Why
is that good?" Without some persuasive response to that question,
Mary's argument, normative argument itself, appears either circular
(importing the conclusion into the premises) or interminable (an
infinite regress incapable of rational adjudication).
7. Arthur Allen Leff, Economic Analysis of Law: Some Realism About Nominalism, 60 VA. L.
REV. 451,454 (1974) (reviewing Richard Posner's ECONOMIC ANALYsIS OF LAW (1992)).
8. See, e.g., Hans A. Linde, Practicing Theory: The Forgotten Law of Initiative Lawmaking 45
UCLA L. REV. 1735, 1744-45 (1998) (applying notions of moral values on the process of
lawmaking); Victoria Nourse, The New Normativity: The Abuse Excuse and the Resurgence ofJudgment
in the CriminalLaw, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1435, 1458-59 (1998) (book review) (discussing application
of morality based judgment in the criminal law context).
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This state of affairs is nothing other than a restatement of the so-
called Is-Ought divide, a divide that gives rise to one of the dogmas of
contemporary ethical thought, the "naturalistic fallacy."9 The basic
idea is that it is impossible to move from an empirical or descriptive
proposition to a normative or prescriptive proposition. That is to say,
there are no "is" statements-no empirical claims about the world-
that yield conclusions about how one ought to behave. Thus Is is Is
and Ought is Ought and never the twain shall meet. Fact and Value
remain eternally separated.
Historically, there have been three major candidates for escaping
this abyss: God, Nature, and Reason. Throughout western history,
one or more entities in that holy trinity served as a bridge over the
chasm between Is and Ought, and as a way out of the problem posed
above. Each member of that trinity has been attacked and, at least to
many minds, discredited."
The tradition of moral argument described here, however, need
not be seen as committing itself to one member of that trinity as the
"foundation" of moral argument. Rather, the description and
defense of the tradition of moral argument I offer here begins with
this insight: a way out of the Is-Ought divide would exist if there were
certain true statements that we could make about the world in which
the empirical and the normative, fact and value, were so inextricably
intertwined that no rational person could deny such statements
either in their empirical or in their normative implications. This
kind of moral argument is characteristic of Aristotle, his Thomistic
descendants, and many contemporary neo-Aristotelians. That is to
say, whether we call them "first principles of practical reason" or
attribute them, as Aquinas did, to a capacity he called synderesisn
there are certain statements about the world that are a practically
inextricable mix of fact and value that no reasonable person could
deny.
Let me use an example from Aristotle's Ethics 12 to illustrate my
9. For the classic formulation of the Is-Ought/Fact-Value divide, see DAVID HUME, A
TREATISE ON HuMAN NATURE I, iv, 6; see also WILAm K. FRANKENA, ETHICS 99-100 (2d ed. 1973)
(providing a concise but clear explanation of the naturalistic fallacy and its weaknesses).
10. See generally AuSDAIR MACINTRE, AFTER VIRTUE (1984) (providing an insightful
narrative of this history in western culture).
11. See, e.g., THOMAS AQUINAS, THE TREATISE ON LAW: SAINT THOMAS AQUINAS SUMMA
THEOLOGIAE, I-I1; QQ 90-97, 237-38 (RJ. Henle, SJ. ed., 1993) (declaring that "[s]ynderesis is
said to be the law of our mind, because it is a habit containing the precepts of the natural law,
which are the first principles of human actions.")
12. See generally ARISTOTLE, NICHOmACHFAN ETHICS (Benjamin Jowett trans., 1947). That
the Nichomachean Ethics is fundamentally a political work, and on the unity of ethics and
politics in Aristotle generally, see ALISDAIR MAcINTYRE, A SHORT HISTORY OF ETHICS 57 (1966).
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point. In Book VII, Aristotle continues his inquiry into the good at
which political science aims.' Aristotle's conclusion is eudaimonia,"
often translated "happiness" but, following contemporary scholars, I
render human flourishing. Aristotle argues that human flourishing
must be the ultimate good because it is something that is good in
itself, something for which we desire all other goods. 5 Aristotle
describes this good as "self-sufficient" but
by self-sufficient we do not mean that which is sufficient for a
man by himself, for one who lives a solitary life, but also for
parents, children, wife, and in general for his friends and
fellow citizens, since man is born for citizenship.
6
Aristotle acknowledges that the conclusion that all human beings
seek flourishing may "seem a platitude" until given fuller definition. 7
Investigating the particular capacities and needs of human beings
advances that process of definition and thereby, sketches some
picture of a complete human life thereby producing an "outline of
the good.""8
There are four important points to be made about this method of
argument. First, it is not deductive or a priori: it respects widely held
views about human reality, but takes experience as its source and
guide. Second, it takes seriously the materiality of human beings-
their need for food, shelter, friendship, care, what might be called
their basic dependency. Third, it is epistemologically modest-it
does not claim to have the exactitude of mathematics, but rather is
content to look for
such precision as accords with the subject-matter, and so much
as is appropriate to the inquiry. For a carpenter and a
geometer investigate the right angle in different ways; the
former does so in so far as the right angle is useful for his
work, while the latter inquires what it is or what sort of thing it
is; for the geometer is a spectator for the truth. 9
And fourth, it uses empirical claims about what human beings are
like as human beings to draw conclusions about the ends human
beings ought to seek.
It is, of course, possible to argue with Aristotle. I will not and
13. SeeARIsToTLE, supra note 13, at 1097a.
14. SeeARISTOTLE, supra note 13, at 1098a.
15. SeeARISTOTLE, supra note 13, at 1097b.
16. SeeARISTOTLE, supra note 13, at 1097b.
17. See ARISTOTLE, supra note 13, at 1097b.
18. SeeARisToTLE, NICHoMAcHEAN ETHIcs 1098b (BenjaminJowett trans., 1947).
19. ARISTOTLE, NICHOMACHEAN ETHICS (BenjaminJowett trans., 1947) 1098a-1098b.
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cannot make a full defense of his position here, but consider this:
What would we say to someone who seriously denied that human
beings need food, or water, or shelter, or education, or the society of
others to flourish? Or someone who claimed that he or she wanted
to be unhappy, that the frustration of his or her desires is what he or
she sought as the goal of his or her actions?
My contention is that someone who holds such positions is to
ethics what someone who denies the principle of non-contradiction is
to logic. Strictly speaking, you cannot "prove" such a person wrong
precisely because he or she, by his or her denial, is abrogating a basic
principle of rationality. But you can walk away in acknowledgement
of the futility of trying to speak with someone who denies the
possibility of meaningful speech itself. The consequences of walking
away may be the strongest form of refutation.
II. THE STRUCTURE OF FINEMAN'S ARGUMENT
Having given a very rough sketch of an ancient tradition of non-
relativistic normative argument, I now want to illustrate why Martha
Fineman's argument for the collective duty of care for caregivers fits
well into that tradition. Initially, however, it is necessary to render
Fineman's argument in a more stylized form.
Premise 1: All human beings experience dependency, invariably at
the beginning of life, frequently at some point during adulthood
(e.g., during debilitating illness), and almost invariably at the end of
life.
20
Premise 2: The human race could not survive (i.e. it is a necessary
and inevitable condition of our existence) without caregivers to tend
us through those periods of dependency.
Premise 3: Society-including the form of political organization we
call the "State"-has a vested interest in the biological preservation of
its members and, in fact, would cease to exist if its members ceased to
22exist as a biological matter.
Conclusion A: Society, therefore, benefits from the work of
20. Fineman, supra note 4, at 18. "Far from being pathological, avoidable and the result of
individual failings, dependency is a universal and inevitable part of the human development It
is inherent in the human condition." As I will emphasize infra Fineman's argument places great
emphasis on the "universality and inevitability" of the empirical claims she makes about the
capacities and needs of human beings. It is my contention that the set of "universal and
inevitable" capacities and needs of human beings, what Fineman terms "inherent in the human
condition," is the functional equivalent of what the Aristotelian tradition means by human
nature.
21. Fineman, supra note 4, at 18.
22. Fineman, supra note 4, at 18-19.
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caregivers in sustaining the existence of its members (which, writ
large, extends to the whole human race).2
Premise 4: If an entity-either an individual or group-derives a
benefit from the uncompensated labor of another entity, and
depends upon that entity for its flourishing, the dependent entity, to
the degree it can, has an obligation to support the care-giving entity
in, at the very least, the giving of care.24
Conclusion B: Accordingly, society (in this case, the state) has an
affirmative duty or obligation to support caregivers."
The similarities between the method of Fineman's argument and
the tradition of argument with which I have associated Aristotle are
striking. Like that tradition, Fineman begins empirically with an
observation about human beings as they actually exist. 6  Like that
tradition, Fineman is especially concerned with the "universal and
inevitable" aspects of the human condition.27 Like that tradition, the
pivotal moment in Fineman's argument is an empirical assertion that
is also inextricably normative: humanity needs caregivers to survive,
therefore, it must support its caregivers. 28 As Fineman herself notes
about that assertion:
In other words, the realization that biological
dependency is both inevitable and universal is
theoretically important. Upon this foundational
realization is built a claim for justice or right-the
demand that society value and accommodate the labor
done by the caretakers of inevitable dependants.29
Now, of course, in theory one could challenge Fineman. Why is
the survival of humanity a good thing? Who cares if the caregivers
23. See Fineman, supra note 4, at 28.
24. See Fineman, supra note 4, at 19. Fineman's text needs some interpretation to fit into
the characterization I have given it, but that interpretation is entirely reasonable. The passage
to which I refer reads:
Certain members of society may be recruited, volunteer, or even be drafted for
service, but they have a right to be compensated for their services from collective
resources. They also have a right to the necessary tools to perform their assigned
tasks and to guarantees that they will be protected by rules and policies that
facilitate their performance. Caretakers should have the same right to have their
society-preserving labor supported and facilitated. Provision of the means for their
task should be considered the responsibility of the collective society.
Id.
25. Fineman, supra note 4, at 19-20.
26. Fineman, supra note 4, at 18.
27. Fineman, supra note 4, at 18.
28. Fineman, supra note 4, at 18-19.
29. Fineman, supra note 4, at 18.
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wither and are unable to sustain those in need?
My response to that wearisome and adolescent line of critique is
the same as to those who challenge Aristotle's contention that all
human beings seek their flourishing or happiness as they understand
it. Namely, that line of critique reveals an abstraction from reality-a
chasm between theory and praxis-so vast as to merit being termed
"pathological." From an interlocutor who seriously and steadfastly
advances such a line of argument, one can only walk away.
That is not to say that Fineman's argument is rationally irrefutable.
Although I agree with Fineman's general and specific conclusions,
reasonable people might disagree inter alia about: (1) the best forms
of subsidy to or support of caregivers; (2) the best sources of such
subsidy; (3) the relative hierarchy of obligations of individuals or
communities geographically and relationally nearer to the caregiver
(friends, neighbors, employers, adult relatives, church, local
community); and (4) the appropriate conditions (if any) that ought
to attach to the support of caregivers.
Nevertheless, Fineman's basic point is unassailable: e.g., that we
are, by nature as human beings, unavoidably, "universally and
inevitably," dependent at critical stages of our lives; that, as
individuals, as societies, and as a species we cannot survive without a
massive investment of time and energy and resources by caregivers;
and that to the extent that we take our biological survival, other
things being equal, as a self-evident condition of flourishing, we must
support caregivers.
We are, in short, all dependent. In recognizing that dependency
we need to surrender unrealistic myths of self-sufficiency, and fulfill
our obligation to support the caregivers upon whom human survival
depends.
III. FINEMAN'S ARGUMENT AS A SALUTARY TREND IN CONTEMPORARY
FEMINISM
Material oppression, at least on a social basis, almost always is
accompanied by ideological oppression. The need of the privileged
to legitimate their privilege appears to be one of the constants of
human history. In the history of the subordination of women,"
"nature" is the frequent recourse of those who justify the status
30. The use of the "natural" tojustify status inferiority is, of course, not unique to the long
and horrible history of sexism. Contemporary ideologies of racism and homophobia have also
relied heavily on the category of the "natural" to justify the subordination of their victims. See,
e.g., JOHN BOSWELL, CHRIsTIANrY, SocIAL TOLERANcE, AND HOMOSEXUALITY: GAY PEoPLE IN
WESTERN EuROPE FROM THE BEGINNING OF THE CHRIsrIAN ERA TO THE FOURTEENTH CENTURY
303-33 (1980) (discussing homophobia in particular).
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inferiority of women. Often "nature" takes the form of biological
determinism, the argument that because of physical differences
between men and women, women are inherently unsuited for
positions of leadership, intellectual endeavor, etc. "Nature" can also
take a more psychological or "spiritual" form, such as characterizing
certain attributes as distinctly "feminine" in order tojustify the status
inferiority of women. In either case, heavy reliance is placed upon
the "universality and inevitability" of the attributed characteristics."
Is it any wonder, then, that those who fight on the intellectual front
of the war against sexism show a particular hostility to terms such as
"human nature"? That they regard assertions of "universality and
inevitability" as inherently suspect? They might even coin an
intrinsically pejorative term, say "essentialism," with which to
confront assertions about the "natural," the "universal," and the
"inevitable"?
Such healthy skepticism is both an appropriate response to the
ideological strategies of the privileged and the cornerstone of critical
empirical consciousness. Virtue, however, lies in the mean. Taken to
an extreme, the rejection of the concept of human nature, a reflexive
hostility to any claims about trans-cultural, trans-historical (universal
and inevitable) qualities of human beings, leads to an irrational and
politically self-defeating subjectivism.
My contention is that a significant part, though certainly not all, of
contemporary feminist theory, like much of contemporary Queer
Theory, is afflicted by precisely that kind of extremism. I make this
charge hesitantly, aware of the way in which opponents of human
equality use distortion and caricature to label movements for human
emancipation "political correctness." Nevertheless, I think the
criticism is a valid one. While not launching into a major defense of
that assertion, I offer two bits of what I regard as extremely probative
evidence.
The first is the amount of energy and passion currently invested by
feminists in the debate over multiculturalism and the appropriate
role of universals. My colleague Led Volpp has written eloquently on
this subject3 2 Much of the political philosopher Martha Nussbaum's
31. See GENDER: KEY CONCEPTS IN CRrITCAL THEORY 3-88 (Carol C. Gould ed., 1997)
(providing an interesting and representative sampling of feminist writings on the naturalness
versus social construction of gender).
32. See Led Volpp, Feminism v. Multiculturalism, in 1998-99JAMESA. THOMAS LECTURE, YALE
LAW SCHOOL (Apr. 5, 1999) (publication forthcoming, on file with the Journal); Led Volpp,
Talking "Culurc'" Gender, Race, Nation and Politics of Multiculturalism, 96 COLUM. L. REv. 1573
(1996) (responding to backlash scholarship that has emerged in academic journals as a result
of the progress of previously oppressed segments of society).
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recent book, Sex and Social Justice,3 is devoted to exactly that topic?'
Unless we are willing to regard the interlocutors of that discussion as
entirely irrational, a clearly unacceptable position, one must infer
that the discussion of universals among feminists is indicative of a real
deficiency in the theoretical framework of contemporary feminism.
My second bit of evidence is drawn from my own experience and
that of others trying to engage in normative discussions in a
multicultural setting. In Sex and Social Justice, Nussbaum recounts two
examples from a conference on international development she
attended. In the first example, a progressive male economist, whom
we are led to believe is sympathetic to feminism, delivered a paper
arguing that
traditional ways of life in a rural area of Orissa, India, [are]
now under threat of contamination from Western
development projects. As evidence of the excellence of this
rural way of life, he points to the fact that whereas we
Westerners experience a sharp split between the values that
prevail in the workplace and the values that prevail in the
home, [in Orissa], by contrast, exists what [he] calls "the
embedded way of life." His example: Just as in the home a
menstruating woman is thought to pollute the kitchen and
therefore may not enter it, so too in the workplace a
menstruating woman is taken to pollute the loom and may not
enter the room where the looms are kept. 5
A woman who is an anthropologist and collaborator with the
economist rises to the economist's defense when some feminists (an
important point to note) challenge his cultural relativism. Drawing
on the anti-essentialist critique of Derrida and Foucault, she argues
that "there is no privileged place to stand" in judging such matters,
and that those who criticize the Orissa practice are importing
Western "essentialist" notions. 6 The anthropologist subsequently
delivers a paper lamenting the introduction of the smallpox vaccine
to India because it helped eliminate the cult of the Sittala Devi, the
goddess to whom local people prayed to avoid smallpox.
7
Nussbaum's anecdotes confirm my own experience: a significant
33. MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM, SEX AND SOCIAL JUSTICE 38 (1999) (defending the empirical
existence of universal ideas of the human, without having to resort to metaphysical
explanation).
34. See id, See especially part I "Justice", chapter 1, "Women and Cultural Universals;"
chapter 2, "The Feminist Critique of Liberalism;" chapter 3, "Religion and Women's Human
Rights;" and particularly chapter 4, "Judging Other Cultures: The Case of Genital Mutilation."
35. Id. at 35.
36. Id.
37. See id.
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amount of feminism, both as high theory and in the ordinary views
espoused in classrooms and political organizations for women,
displays the kind of misguided hostility toward universals evident in
Nussbaum's examples.
Fineman's approach offers a way out of that irrational hostility.
Admittedly, the tradition of normative argument with which I have
compared Fineman's argument is, itself, fraught with the most
horrifically sexist and inhumane conclusions. It was Aristotie, after
all, who described the marriage relationship between a man and
woman as analogous to master and slave.s' That is the problem,
however, with any normative argument that relies on empirical
observation: sometimes you get things wrong. A spirit of self-
correction, of constant and careful attention to the rich texture and
fine detail of human experience, and a profound sensitivity to the
marginalized and the oppressed, what the theology of liberation
called a "preferential option for the poor," are essential to
maintaining the vitality of such a method of moral argument. I am
convinced, however, that such a method holds the greatest promise
for feminists and those who labor on behalf of human emancipation.
Martha Fineman has made such an argument. My hope is that
other feminists will follow.
38. See ARIsToTLE, PoLrIcs 1252(b), Bk I, Ch. 1 (Benjamin Jowett trans., 1947)
(discussing the analogy).
